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THE EFFECT OF WAR ON CONTRACTS. By George J. Webber. London: The
Solicitors' Law Stationery Society, 1946. 2d ed. Pp. 802. £3 17s 6d.
THE first edition of this work was published in 1940. Within six years a
new edition, "three times as large as the first," has been made desirable,
partly by the developments caused by the recent war, partly by a number
of decisions in the House of Lords reversing some views that had generally
prevailed, and partly because of the author's desire, to make a more thorough
and critical review of the field. This edition well deserves a full review on its
own merits.
In a foreword by Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, this work is described as "es-
sentially a practitioner's book"; but there is no less reason for describing it
as a book for law students, law professors, and judges. They will find here a
thorough and critical review of great numbers of court decisions, with a full
statement of the facts and a full and fair exposition of the reasoning of the
judges; they will find also a presentation of the theories of legal scholars as
well as the author's original analysis of problems and matured views on
questions of policy.
The book is especially useful to American lawyers because nowhere else is
so complete a picture of English case law available and because to a very
considerable extent American case law and theory are stated for comparison.
The fact that British statutes and administrative orders are continually
referred to is not a defect from the American standpoint; for the same prob-
lems are dealt with in our own statutes and orders, and comparison is
profitable. Not many decisions of our state courts are cited.
The book is divided into four Parts. Of these, Part I contains chapters on
the Duration and Termination of War, Emergency Powers, Who is an
Enemy, Contracts with an Enemy, and Procedural Capacity of Enemy
Aliens. With all of these our courts have been and will continue to be fre-
quently concerned. Part II deals with the effect of war on specific kinds of
Commercial Contracts, including Agency, Corporate Shareholders, Sales,
Negotiable Instruments, Insurance, Freight, and Service.
Parts III and IV fill much more than half of the book and deal with the
subject of Frustration of Contract. It is here that the greatest contribution
of the author is found; and it is to this that the reviewer will direct his
specific comment.
When a court holds that a contractor's duty is discharged by impossibility
of performance or by frustration of object, the explanation commonly made
has been that the contractor's duty is impliedly conditioned on the con-
tinued possibility of performance and of attainment of the purpose for which
the contract was made. This implied condition is supposed to be such by
reason of the actual intention of the parties, to be discovered by a process of
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interpretation and factual inference from the language of the agreement.
The starting point has been that "the courts cannot make a contract for the
parties" and that impossibility is no excuse unless the parties have them-
selves agreed that it shall be one.
In many cases, however, this doctrine has been disregarded, even though
the court has been forced to admit that the supervening event that has
caused impossibility or frustration is one that the parties did not in fact
foresee and as to which their contract is silent. Sometimes it is said that the
court should not "imply" a condition except such as the parties themselves
would have agreed on if they had foreseen the events that subsequently
occurred. What they might have agreed, had they thought about it, is a
very doubtful speculation.
It has long been observed by the more analytically inclined judges that
the asserted "intention of the parties" is often in fact the intention of the
judges. The process is one of judicial "construction" even though expressed
in terms of mere "interpretation." While it is literally true that the courts
do not make a contract for the parties, it is also literally true that it is the
courts and not the parties who determine the legal operation of any contract
that the parties have made. And this legal operation varies with the facts
and events occurring after its making. In making its determination, the
court starts with the process of interpretation of the words and other ex-
pressions of the parties; by this process it attempts to discover the intention
and the understanding of each of the parties. The meaning given by each
party to his own expressions and to those of the other party may be far from
identical with that given to them by the other party. The court must deter-
mine whose meaning should prevail, a matter dependent on substantive
contract law and not upon agreement of the parties.
After interpretation and the adoption of a judicially accepted meaning,
comes the process of judicial construction, using this phrase to describe the
process of adjudging the legal relations of the parties: their rights and duties,
and it may be, their powers, privileges and immunities. These legal relations
do not spring into being, complete and immutable, at the instant of con-
tracting. They vary with the march of time and with subsequent events.
If the parties have foreseen and provided for these subsequent events, as
interpretation may show, the legal relations will be adjudged consistently
with that interpretation. Thus, the terms of the contract may include a
provision with respect to strikes, or war, or delay, or non-performances great
or small. With some very important and extensive limitations, men still
have a very broadly inclusive "liberty of contract." But the provisions that
they insert may be very loose and indecisive; and many events occur that
are not foreseen or provided for in any way.
More often than not, an event that causes "impossibility of performance"
or "frustration of object" is not actually provided for. The parties have no
thought that the hired music hall may be destroyed by fire; and there is not
the slightest expression as to whether the hirer must still pay the rent, or
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whether the owner must pay damages for not having the hall ready for the
exhibition 1 or must make restitution of rental that was paid in advance.
In joyful anticipation of the coronation of the king, contracts are made
for the rental of roofs and windows along the announced course of the coro-
nation pageant, without a thought that the king's illness may cause the
pageant to be abandoned. On the prescribed day, the owner has his roof
and his window ready. Must the tenant pay the agreed rental though no
gilded procession will pass by? 2 Must the owner make restitution of rental
that was paid in advance? 3
In 1939 a contract was made by Fairbairn, a British manufacturer, and
Fibrosa, a Polish company, for the manufacture of certain machinery and
its delivery at Gdynia. Fibrosa paid £1,000 in advance. The contract ex-
pressly provided for a "reasonable extension of time" if delivery should be
"hindered or delayed . . . by strikes, war," and other named events. Two
months later England was at war with Germany and the Germans occupied
Poland. In 1940, Fibrosa sued for damages for nondelivery, or alternatively
for restitution of the £1,000. The trial court and the Court of Appeal held
that Fibrosa had no right to either damages or restitution. The House of
Lords agreed with respect to damages, but reversed the lower courts as to
restitution. The contract was held to be "frustrated" by war and the
Trading with the Enemy Act, and that Fairbairn's duty to deliver was dis-
charged, not merely postponed; but the House of Lords held, overruling
Chandler v. Webster, that there was a quasi contractual right to restitution
of the money paid in advance. 4 This decision agrees with the American law
as expressed in the Restatement of Restitution.
The author of the present volume presents these cases, and many others
in the same field, with great fulness and critical insight. He indicates the
increasing tendency for the judges to hold that a promisor's duty is condi-
tional on continued possibility, not because such was the intention of the
parties as found by inferential interpretation but because in the opinion of
the court justice so requires. This is most notably expressed in the opinions
of Lord Wright. There is no "implied term"; the promisor's duty is "con-
structively" conditional. Some of the judges adhere to the older forms of
expression. The author himself agrees with Lord Wright, saying: "This, it
1. In Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826 (1863), the court held that the owner was not
liable in damages, because his duty was "impliedly conditional" on the continued existence
of the hall.
2. In Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K. B. 740, the court held that the contract, so far as
executory, was "frustrated" and the rent not yet due at time of abandonment never became
due.
3. In Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 K. B. 493, the court held that the hirer had no
right to restitution of rental paid in advance and that he must still pay instalments of rent
that fell due before abandonment of the pageant. Forty years later, the House of Lords has
expressly overruled this decision in Fibrosa Sp. Ak. v. Fairbairn L.C.B. Ltd. [1943] A.C. 32.
To this case the author devotes many pages.
4. The Fibrosa case, supra.
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is submitted, is the true basis of the modern doctrine of frustration of the
adventure; the 'implied condition' is, in the last analysis, a 'constructive
condition' read into the contract by the court and imputed to the parties." 5
The author follows the English judges in treating "frustration of contract"
as a kind of impossibility of performance. This is fully justified where the
facts are like those in the Fibrosa case. The performance promised by Fair-
bairn was made impossible by war and Act of Parliament; and the purpose
for which Fibrosa promised to make payment of the price was wholly frus-
trated. In many cases of "frustration" this is not true. In Chandkr v.
Webster and the other "Coronation cases," no performance promised by
either party became "impossible" in any sense of that word. The roofs and
windows could still be occupied and the rental could still be paid. Nor was
the "object" of the contract frustrated; a "contract" has no object. In any
contract each of the two parties has a purpose for which he makes it; but
these two purposes are never identical. The abandonment of the coronation
pageant "frustrated" the purpose of the one who hired the roof or the
windows, a purpose that was known to the owner though not embodied in
any way in the words of the contract, and a purpose but for which the roof
and the windows would have had little rental value. This purpose would be
"frustrated" even though the promised performances were fully rendered.
The purpose of the owner was not frustrated in any respect by the king's
illness. His purpose was the getting of the promised money. This purpose is
indeed frustrated by the latest decision of the House of Lords; it required no
court decision to frustrate the purpose of the hirer.0
It is not every frustration of one contractor's purpose that should be held
to discharge him from his promissory duty. There is such a frustration in
every instance of a blasted hope. Undoubtedly the cases will multiply in
which a disappointed contractor asserts his frustration as a defense or as a
reason for restitution. Witness the many conflicting tenancy cases in our
State courts where the purpose of one who rents a building for a saloon is
frustrated by a prohibition law. A solving principle may be something like
this: A contractor is not discharged by frustration of his purpose unless that
purpose was known to the other party and the possibility of its attainment
was an essential factor in giving to the consideration furnished by that other
party the value that enabled him to induce the advantageous bargain. In
5. Again, he says on page 414: "The time has come to shed the fiction of 'implied con-
tract' and to regard the doctrine as a mode by which, upon the facts of a case, the court
itself does justice in circumstances for which the parties never provided."
6. This reviewer therefore agrees with Dr. Cecil A. Wright, quoted by the author on
page 443, to the effect that, when an event frustrates the purpore of one of the parties with-
out frustrating the purpose of the other, the duty of the one may be partly or wholly dis.
charged and the duty of the other not discharged at all. The duty of the hirer of the Coro-
nation windows was constructively conditional on continued poSsibiiity of the pageant; but
he could waive the condition, tender the full agreed payment, and enforce the ovner's
promise to permit occupancy. The author is quite right in saying that this anlyris is not that
of the English judges. They may yet adopt it when the proper case arises.
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the Fibrosa case there was a total "failure of the consideration" for the
buyer's money, both that which was paid in advance and that which was.
merely promised. In the Coronation cases there was merely a depreciation
in the value of the consideration. Nevertheless, that depreciation was so
great that the overruling of Chandler v. Webster must be approved, The
owner is not justified by the existing social and business mores in demanding
payment of the fortuitously high rent for his worthless window seats or in
retaining that rent if already received. If he had been put to expense in
preparing the windows for occupancy, the courts may still find it desirable
to allow compensation or to divide the loss.
When, for the purpose of avoiding obvious injustice, the court holds that a
promise is constructively conditional on some fact or event not actually pro-
vided for by the parties, the judicial process is essentially the same as when
the court finds a promise by making an "implication" that is not true inter-
pretation. The difference between an implied condition and a constructive
condition is the same in character as that between an implied promise and a
constructive promise. The author was logically correct when in his first
edition he declared that constructive conditions and constructive promises.
are alike quasi contractual. Both are based on court action and not on actual
expressions of assent. His present acknowledgment of error in his former
statement is quite unnecessary; but it may be sound diplomacy in avoiding
attacks by those who like to adhere to old fictions in forms of expression. 7
It took the Fibrosa case to re-establish the law of Quasi Contract in Eng-
land and to restore to good standing the views that Lord Mansfield ex-
pressed in Moses v. Macferlan in 1760. The present reviewer expressed the
view in the pages of this Journal in 1912 that "Quasi Contract," as thus far
in judicial use, is applicable only to non-contractual obligations for the
payment of money, usually measured by value received and created to avoid
an unjust enrichment.8 As so used, the term denotes a constructive promise
but not a constructive condition of a promissory duty. A constructive or
"quasi" contract creates a legally enforceable duty; a constructive or "quasi"
condition is a fact or event without which a legally enforceable duty does
not exist. The first creates duty; the second limits duty. But xqothing will
be gained by fighting for a particular definition of the term "quasi contract."
ARTHUR L. CORBINt
7. The author, making liberal use of italics, quotes Lord Wright, Legal Essays and
Addresses, 259, as follows: "The truth is that the court, or jury, as a judge of fact, decides
this question in accordance with what seems to be just and reasonable in its eyes. The judge
finds in himself the criterion of what is just and reasonable. The court is in this sense making
a contract for the parties-though it is almost blasphemy to say so. But the power of the court
to do this is most beneficial, and indeed even essential."
8. Corbin, Quasi Contractual Obligations (1912) 21 YALE L. J. 533.
f William K. Townsend, Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale Law School.
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS. By Charles T. McCormick
and James H. Chadbourn. Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1946.
Pp. xvii, 878. 88.00.
FEDERAL jurisdiction and practice still remains the lawyer's dream world.
As the editors here point out, before the 1934 Act authorizing new rules of
civil procedure, federal practice was "a comparatively placid pool," with the
votaries thereof accepting with equanimity the complexities of conformity
and the dominion of "general" law, "peculiarities which however strange to
the tyro possessed a pleasurable element of the esoteric." I How true this
was! The pleasures and the mysteries of the federal field were distinctly
matters for the expert with the knowledge as well as the kind of mind to
know and to enjoy these ptoblems. Then came the persistent and successful
reform of the procedure itself, but it was accompanied by a drastic revulsion
against general law in favor of the substantive law of the several states.2
That kept the balance of indecision about the same as before. Moreover, in
spite of some appeals for reform, nothing substantial has been done to make
clear such mysteries as the confines and the boundaries of federal jurisdic-
tion, removal of cases from state courts, the separable controversy, the
jurisdictional amount, venue, service of process, and the federal question.
Indeed, these seem to increase in complexity as the spate of federal regula-
tory legislation brings more and more cases to the federal courts. It is a field
of law both fascinating and important-a proper subject for a law course.
That clients may suffer from unneeded complexities perhaps should not
overdistress us; we should remember Baron Surrebutter's famous answer to
Crogate's inquiry as to how the suitors liked the new sort of changes afforded
by rules of special pleading in 1834: "Mr. Crogate, that consideration has
never occurred to me, nor do I conceive that laws ought to be adapted to
suit the tastes and capacities of the ignorant." 3
Hence a course and a casebook on the federal courts is a desirable, indeed
a necessary, part of a law school curriculum. The present volume appears
to be a very useful teaching tool. The editors have had extensive experience
and can be relied upon to select the best materials in the field for pedagogical
purposes. The book is modern and up to date, an outstanding requirement
in view of the constant changes occurring each term of court. And so far as I
can tell from my examination without actual use of the materials, the editors
have covered all the essential topics of outstanding interest to federal prac-
titioners.
Of course, each of us is likely to have some special favorite topic which he
1. Preface, vii.
2. Clark, State Law in tke Federal Courts. The Brooding Omniprescnco of Eric v. Tomp-
kins (1946) 55 YALE L. J. 267.
3. HAYES, CROGATE'S CASE: A DIALOUE IN YE SmIUES oN SrErcL% PL.EADi;G R-
FoEII, reprinted in 9 HOLDSWORTh, HistoRY OF ENGLISn LAw (2d ed. 193) 417.
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may like to expand or embroider. I can note several that I would have been
inclined to develop somewhat more extensively. Thus the editors do give
attention to the rule of Hum v. Oursler,4 that an entire cause of action, of
which a part is federal, is wholly within federal jurisdiction; but they give
only a limited view of some of the difficulties which have appeared in its ap-
plication. They cite the opposing opinions of a distinguished district judge,6
but avoid the questions which have arisen in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals as to this problem and the allied one of "final" judgments and ap-
pealability thereof.6 But when I suggest topics of this sort, I am bound to.
recognize that my view very probably is a restricted one, based on the prob-
lems which appear to have come to my court more than to other courts. Or
is it that other courts have been more successful in avoiding the difficulties
which have worried us?
The book treats compactly eleven different general subjects, including the
usual grounds of federal jurisdiction, removal procedure, conflicts between
state and national judicial systems, and with a very interesting section deal-
ing with the Tompkins case and the developing rules thereunder.7 The chap-
ter on procedure, dealing with the new federal civil rules, is properly limited
to the peculiar matters governing federal jurisdiction and practice, rather
than to general principles of pleading. The subjects of appellate jurisdiction
and procedure, in both the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
and the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court seem adequately treated.
The casebook ends quite properly with the already famous case of Georgia v.
Pennsylvania Railroad 8 which opens new vistas of original jurisdiction for
our highest court.
There is one matter which the editors stress and which I wish could have
been more definitely brought out in the body of material, although I xealize
the difficulties. That is the need, as the editors put it, "for simplifying and
rationalizing the Federal practice as the new Rules have done." They say
that a beginning is made by the teacher who leads his class to consider the
jurisdictional barriers and obstacles resulting from the constitutional divi-
sion of powers between state and nation. But they also urge that "an ordered
reconsideration of the whole structure seems overdue." 9 I know that it is
difficult in a casebook to work out suggestions for definite reforms beyond
the queries stated in footnotes. But possibly something more might have
been done by liberal quotations from the proposed drafts of the revision of
the Judicial Code." These drafts show most interesting attempts at im-
4. 289 U. S. 238 (1933).
5. See p. 123 of the book.
6. Cases are collected in 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1945 Cum. Supp.) 90-94;
3 id. 141-152; and see (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1476.
7. See note 2 supra.
8. 324 U. S. 439 (1945).
9. Preface, ix.




provement, but suggest the query why, if these are proposed, a more com-
plete revamping of the entire structure is not also in order." It is to be hoped
that teachers using this admirable casebook will follow the urging of the
editors and both stress the need of the ordered reconsideration they call for,
and develop proposals of detailed reform to achieve that end.
CHARLEs E. C&Rrt#
THE EcoO Cmc MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 1606-1865. By Joseph
Dorfman. New York: The Viking Press, 1946. Two vols. Pp. xii, 987.
AMONG the adjustments which the rise of American civilization has forced
upon us, and indeed upon the world, none is more important than the re-
valuation of what might be called the American way of thought. This is true
even of our contributions to world culture. Colonial peoples and provincial
communities, like children, are expected to be seen but not heard; and when
they do speak up their juvenile pipings are liable to be ignored. European
economists visiting in this country have often expressed astonishment not
only at the prodigious number of professors they encountered but still more
at the "fact," as one of them remarked to me some years ago, that in spite
of our vast numbers we had somehow failed to produce any such germinal
minds as those of Max Weber and Werner Sombart. Since I am not an
admirer of either, I refrained from suggesting that their position in the world
of letters may have been due quite as much to their being German as to their
being germinal. I also refrained from even murmuring the names of Henry
George and Thorstein Veblen. For if Progress and Poverty and The Theory of
the Leisure Class appear on future lists of the world's great books, no doubt
that also will be due not only to their intrinsic merits but also to their Amer-
ican origin.
But more important than the discovery of occasional outcroppings of
genius is the mapping of the whole landscape of the American mentality.
In the past, the world has paid very little attention even to main currents in
American thought, since it has never seemed to matter very much what
Americans thought. It does matter today, and that circumstance lends
unique importance to the work of scholars such as Beard and Parrington.
This is true in even greater degree of Professor Dorfman's work. The
American way of life has other aspects, but its economic aspect has certainly
been paramount throughout our history and is so still. Why Americans
think as they do about industry and business, about property and money-
making, about the thrift of private citizens and the profligacy of govern-
11. Thus note the e-xtensive revision of the venue provisions, and the addition of power
to transfer cases from one district to another, DRAMts, note 10 supra, §§ 1391(a), 1404. See
also § 1360, an attempt to state the Hum rule, note 4 supra.
* United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
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ments, these are matters which nobody can afford any longer to ignore-
least of ail votaries of the law.
In scope and coverage The Economic Mind in American Civilizalion is a
truly monumental book. Professor Dorfman's task was a prodigiously
difficult one. For the pattern and direction of our economic ideas and
attitudes has been determined not so much by main currents as by the con-
fluence of an immense number of tiny rivulets distributed over a continental
watershed and all flowing in pretty much the same direction because of
geographical circumstances common to them all. This is not to say that the
record reveals no outstanding personalities, nor is Professor Dorfman dis-
posed to minimize real greatness. On the contrary, it is our good fortune
that such a study as this should have been undertaken by the author of
Thorstedn Veblen and His America. But great as they were, men such as
Hamilton and Jefferson were founders not so much of schools of thought as
of a nation; while Francis Wayland and Henry C. Carey, though they were
pre-eminent in the field of economic authorship, were expounders rather
than creators-McGuffeys rather than Adam Smiths.
Professor Dorfman is careful not to dogmatize. But on his showing the
American economic landscape seems to have been shaped by two major
forces. One of these is the institution and ideology of property, feudal in
substance though commercial in form, which America received as its chief
institutional heritage from European civilization. As Professor Dorfman
shows, this theme runs as a constant through the most diverse variations of
expression. It was the ground base of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democ-
racy, never to be forgotten however salutary may be the emphasis on other
aspects of those movements. It provided the ballast of tradition to the
defense of slavery as it had to the earliest attacks on Puritan theocracy.
Cotton Mather might denounce Roger Williams as a rebel. He may have
"lived and dreamed," as Parrington has said, "in a future he was not to see";
but it was a future in which Locke would have worsted Sir Robert Filmer,
one in which divine right would have given way to natural right and dynasty
to property.
The other major influence upon the American economic mind during the
first two and a half centuries of our development was commerce. Through-
out the colonial period and half way through the nineteenth century the
relationship of the American community to Europe and especially to Great
Britain was of paramount importance. Thus, as Professor Dorfman points
out in his Preface,
The most potent determinant of economic action and thought
was world commerce-the commerce that gave us treasure, the
commerce that brought foreign goods and took our exports, that
profited shipper, middleman, and speculator; the commerce, in
short, that created the rich urban community and enlarged the
money economy. Domestic trade and industrial production were
important, but in the eyes of the articulate actors, they were merely
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adjuncts to the expanding and profitable activity in world trade.
The domestic economy was animated by the larger economy em-
bracing the old world and the new.
After the war between the states the picture changes and domestic business
becomes "the principal covcern of thought and policy." Professor Dorfman
promises additional volumes which "will, I hope, soon follow these," dealing
with the economic mind of the empire of American business. But during the
earlier period the mind's eye was continually fixed upon trade; and that is
why Adam Smith and Ricardo found such eager readers, and the commercial
philosophy of the nation of shopkeepers such ready acceptance, on this side
of the Atlantic.
As his publishers foresaw and noted on the jacket, Professor Dorfman's
work will inevitably be compared with that of Beard and Parrington. One
difference is obvious. Both Beard and Parrington are interpreters, and of
course distinguished interpreters. In each case the reader sees American
thought and civilization through the eyes and words of a great historian
who is also a great writer. Beard's interpretations and Parrington's char-
acterizations have themselves become a part of the record of American
civilization. It is impossible to compare Dorfman's performance with theirs,
since Dorfman is not a performer at all in their sense.
What Dorfman does is to let the record speak for itself. In the most
literal sense the reader is left to make his own interpretations. Three pages
of preface contain virtually all the author has to say by way of comment,
and I have therefore run some risk of misrepresenting the book by quoting
from its most unrepresentative part. But I must also avoid giving the im-
pression that the book is just a compendium of quotations or a barren
catalogue of ideas and opinions. On the contrary, the prodigious industry
which went into the gathering of this immense mass of material (over a
period of twelve years) is fully matched by the skill with which Professor
Dorfman has reduced it to manageable proportions and intelligible form,
often by judicious quotation, but still more by indirect discourse in which
the spirit as well as the substance of the original survives the reducing
process.
It is for this that, as Professor Wesley Mitchell says, "the nation owes a
debt of gratitude to Joseph Dorfman" for a book which "will become one of
the classics studied by our children's children." For scope and inclusiveness
no other record is even comparable. Here is a faithful rendering of the
economic prepossessions of our men of destiny and of all the well-knovn
contributors to American economic literature; but here also are a host of
figures, representative of their times and their localities, whose names even
are unknown to most of us: obscure "Loco-Focos" like Henry Vathake;
Louisa C. McCord, "the Harriet Martineau of the South"; "the Ricardo of
the South," Thomas Roderick Dew; and many others no less picturesque.
Even so, Professor Dorfman has necessarily practiced the art of selection.
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His coverage of the explicitly economic outpourings of the American mind is,
I think, complete. But every task must have its limits, and he has set the
explicitly economic as his limit. He has made no effort to supplement
Parrington's interpretation of the social and economic currents that run
through our general Literature (with a capital L), nor as he tried to embrace
the law. The Economic Mind in American Civilization contributes no
ammunition of precedents to the legal arsenal. But lawyers who seek to
understand the law as an embodiment of American mentality will find this
book invaluable.
C. E. AYRESt
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1776 to 1946. By Edwin Borchard. Indian-
apolis: National Foundation for Education in American Citizenship, by
the National Foundation Press. 1946. Pp. 69.
IN sixty-nine pages, Mr. Borchard seeks to outline the course of American
foreign policy from 1776 to the pteparation of the United Nations Charter.
The first two parts are dominantly factual and national in nature, having a
minimum of theoretical and critical comment; but the third part injects a
greater amount of the international problem, legal theory and analysis,
probably because it avowedly looks to the future, not of only the United
States, but of international relations.
Part one, which consists of thirty-seven pages, is devoted to the period up
to 1914, and touches briefly the familiar points of non-intervention, neu-
trality, recognition, the Monroe Doctrine, freedom of the seas, arbitration,
Pan Americanism and similar issues. Part two, which consists of eighteen
pages, takes the discussion up to 1945, with summary reference to the
American problems of World War I, the struggle of the thirties over inter-
vention and neutrality, and World War II. The development of the Ameri-
can issues in World War II is built around brief discussion of the Atlantic
Charter, the Four Freedoms, Lend-Lease, the declaration of 5 January 1943,
and the London and Potsdam conferences of 1945.
Part three raises five problems on an international level, and poses the
issues for the future. Those five problems, almost self-defining for the spe-
cialist, are, according to Mr. Borchard, the realities of international politics,
sovereign states, the machinery of international negotiation, international
law and its effect on the United States, and international organization.
Through all of them run the practical political problems of the position of
small states, the advisability of defending the status quo, and possible power
politics. For the future, Mr. Borchard sees four alternatives confronting
the United States-participation within the United Nations with defensive
preparation against possible power action, complete withdrawal from the
tProfessor of Economics, University of Texas.
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international field and action on the basis of nationalistic motives, imple-
mentation of the Chapultepec agreement and hemisphere action, and an
exclusively American policy. Mr. Borchard makes no prediction as to the
election among these four alternatives, considering the future unpredictable,
because of the lack of a clear-cut policy.
The reader who has no technical background may find this all too brief
analysis of American foreign policy hard, and even unfruitful, reading, when
taken alone. Requirements of brevity have forced the use of some technical
phrases and some undeveloped references to historical materials which may
seem obscure to the uninitiated. However, they could not remain so for a
truly inquiring reader. For this reason it is perhaps unfortunate that neither
Mr. Borchard nor his sponsors saw fit to include a bibliography which could
be used to supplement the skeletal outline so admirably done in this work.
The person who brings some equipment in American diplomatic history
or in international law to the reading of these sixty-nine pages will find in
them a provocative attempt to reduce the statement of issues to an absolute
minimum. Inevitably his personal political convictions and his special pro-
fessional interests will evoke some criticism of the treatment of some of the
issues. For example, one might wish for more than six and a half lines on
expatriation in Part one, and a slight reference to the treatment of aliens, in
view of the present day problems of displaced persons and persons refusing
repatriation. The same might be raised as to American relations with the
League of Nations. But, notwithstanding such elements for possible differ-
ence, such a reader cannot fail to pay homage to an expert's effort to give
lay readers a concise and deeply etched picture of the problem.
It is perhaps this effort of the expert to write briefly and clearly for a lay
audience which constitutes the major contribution of this book. Too often
given to excessive class consciousness, the expert-and particularly the legal
expert,--is prone to center his attention on a single facet of a problem and to
express himself in the jargon of the inner sanctum of his trade, as incom-
prehensible to the American taxpayer as ancient Greek. In these days of
demand for open diplomacy openly arrived at the taxpayer has a right to
look to his fellow citizen who is an expert for assistance. Until the expert
tries to give a comprehensive summary of major problems and the benefit
of his professional training, he has little right to quarrel if his fellow citizens
seem ill informed. These sixty-nine pages represent the expert's effort to
meet that need,-an effort which merits serious attention and emulation.
PHOEBE MORPJSONt
t Executive Secretary and Director of Research, Foundation for Foreign Affairo,
Washington, D. C.
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LE PROBLEME DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL Am! RICAIN, 9TUDIK SPgCIALE-.
MENT A LA LUMIERE DES CONVENTIONS PANAM RICAINES DE LA HAVANE.
By M. M. L. Savelberg (A. A. M. Stols, editor). The Hague. Pp. xix, 361.
THE title of this book, written by a well known international lawyer, itself
presents problems of interest. Is there something like an American inter-
national law, as differing from the international law of all nations? Political
and legal questions are interwoven in this field. Latin America is tied in
political questions to North America, in legal ones to Europe. In politics
the American continent is the home of electoral monarchies in which the
head of state is at the same time the head of the administrative power. In,
Europe these two functions have carefully separated, in the absence of dicta-
torship. In the legal field both the European continent and Latin America
are ruled by deductive law; the Anglo-American countries are ruled by
inductive law. These political and legal variations have to be taken into.
account in any attempt to decide whether there is a distinctive American
international law; whether it may be in formation, and whether that may
be an advantage for this continent or a curse for the whole world, of which
this continent is a part.
Only a small number of the 360 pages of this work are dedicated to these
questions. The book is restricted to a very careful, very scholarly, sometimes
brilliant discussion of seven of the Inter-American conventions of Havana,.
namely on 1) Aliens; 2) Treaties; 3) Diplomatic Officers; 4) Consular Agents;
5) Maritime Neutrality; 6) Asylum; and 7) Rights and Duties in event of
Civil Strife. The four other conventions on Commercial Aviation, Copy-
right, Private International Law and Pan American Union are not included.
Even "Le Droit Amgricain Codifig" would be a title much too wide for the
content of the book.
But this is no reproach. "Qui peu embrasse, mieux 6lreinl," a slight varia-
tion of a French maxim, would be well fitting this work. The author dis-
cusses the history of these treaties, the origin and the aspects of their provi-
sions with a profound knowledge and with a sound feeling for the essential
problems.
He rightly calls the position of foreigners the gauge of the civilization of a
country. In quite a number of the contracting states this situation has not
improved since the signature of the treaties. It has not hitherto been suffi-
ciently emphasized that Article 5 of the Convention on the Status of Aliens
grants to foreigners more than equal rights with the nationals. It "guar-
antees to foreigners a certain minimum of rights, independently of the legal
conditions accorded to nationals." This destroys the theory that the right
of the national is the ceiling of the foreigner's rights.' Article 5 grants for-
eigners "all individual guarantees extended to nationals and the enjoyment
of essential civil rights." In other words, municipal law may deprive na-
1. Hofmannsthal, Laigualdad del extranjero con el nacional (1938) 2 REv. ARGENTINA
DE DEREcHO INTERNAciONAL 278.
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tionals, but not foreigners, of essential civil rights. This is not more than the
codification of a rule of international law which is valid everywhere, but not
always accepted.
Moreover, the real situation in countries which have ratified the conven-
tion, is frequently at variance with this rule. The right to work is one of the
most important civil rights. 2 It surpasses in importance the right to prop-
erty.3 Many Latin American countries impair this right to foreigners. In
the United States, which is more liberal in this respect than most other
countries, four states exclude foreigners from such professions as plumber
-and barber, twelve from the profession of embalmer, six from the profession
-of architect, etc. Every contracting state, and also non-contracting states
-under general principles of international law, could object to measures im-
pairing the right to work. Not one does it, because each government wants
to retain the right to similar measures. This situation provides a persuasive
argument for the necessity of allowing the individual affected by a breach
-of conventions or of international law a right of action independent of that
of his government.
4
With regard to the Convention on Maritime Neutrality it may be worth
observing that many of its rules become senseless without a clear and uni-
form limit of territorial waters. In modern times endeavors to change the
three-mile rule have been frequent.5 There are good arguments to change
this "outmoded" rule,6 originating from a time when three miles had a rela-
tion to the range of cannon. But a change, which may alter the legal condi-
tions of a maritime space larger than the territory of the United States, must
be uniform. If every state were allowed to legislate arbitrarily on the ex-
tention of its sovereignty over the surface of the sea,7 the result would be
chaos 8 and many provisions of maritime conventions would become sense-
2. IN=TER-A ,mRicAN JuRIDIcAL Co'mnTEE, PA. _AmEaRcAN UNIoN, DRFT Drc oA-
TIoNs OF THE INTERNATioNAL RIGHTs AND DuTrrs OF MAN (Mar. 1946) Art. XIV.
3. Id.atArt. VIII.
4. (1923) 50 JOURN.LDE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Clunet) 465 ss. Borchard, Rcspnsi-
bility of States for Danage Done in their Territories to the Person or Property of Foreigners
(1926) 20 Azm. J. INT. L. 73S; Borchard, The Access of Indiiduals to International Courts
(1930) 24 Am. J. INT. L. 359; Witenberg, Report to the International Law Aszzciation
(1930) 344. See 1 HYDE, INTERNOATrONAL LAW (2d ed. 1945) 39-40.
5. "As late as 1930 at the Hague Conference... 13 states, including the Standi-
navian and Mediterranean, denied the international validity of the three-mile rule and in-
sisted either on their four, six or twelve-mile rule, respectively, or on a rule which would
vary for different purposes, namely, control of fisheries, innocent passage, revenue protec-
-don, and neutrality, or on a zone of jurisdiction contiguous to the territorial marginal cea."
Borchard, Resources oflh Continental Shelf (1946) 40 A. J. INT. L. 53, 56-7.
6. BiNGHAM, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw or PACIFIC Co. sT, FxsnRIu s
,(1938).
7. In opposition to the subsoil and sea bed, see Prodarnation by the Presidert With
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of tAx Continental Shdlf (1946) 40
Am. J. INT. L. Surr. 45; Borchard, toc. cit. supra note 5.
8. "Within what are generally recognized as the territorial limits of the state by the
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less. Imagine the impossible task of the captains fighting the battle of the
Graf Spee near the shores of Uruguay and Argentina, if at every moment of
their action they had to consider autonomous and different rules of the two
states on the extention of their territorial waters, in order to avoid a viola-
tion of their neutrality.
At the end of his book the author embarks on an interesting experiment.
He drafts a change of the seven Inter-American conventions into inter-
national conventions. In doing so, he draws a line between what he con-
siders existing international law and what he considers desirable changes of
international law. But this line is sometimes a little hazy. For instance,
the author drafts an international right of asylum.9 Although he charac-
terized this right as a special feature of Inter-American law which has not
been recognized by European countries with the exception of Spain, he ex-
presses the opinion, that the recent experiences of the Spanish Civil War have
changed the situation, because some European countries (Belgium, Holland,
Norway, Poland, Roumania) and two Asiatic countries (China and Turkey)
granted an asylum to political refugees in their legations in Spain. The
author's opinion might better be based on the practice of European coun-
tries in former times,10 which merely fell into oblivion in Europe because of
stabilized conditions," than on this isolated occurrence. The situation
created by Bolshevism, Fascism, Nazism between the two wars, and the
situation in Eastern European countries after the last war would have
justified the revival of this right, which in the last few decades has been
practiced only in Latin America. In any international formulation of this
right it should be extended to the property of the refugees. The Argentine
Embassy in Madrid, by refusing to do that and by applying local Spanish
law, practically revealed such property to the persecuting authorities. 2
The last page of the book contains an useful annex showing the signatures
law of nations, a State may define its boundaries on the sea and the boundaries of its coun-
ties." (Italics ours). Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 264 (1891).
9. In the sense of "Internal Asylum" after the terminology used by the Argentine
Ministery of Foreign Affairs and Worship in its PROJECT OF A CONVENTION ON TuE RUIhT
OF AsYLUm comprising the right of asylum in legations, military installations and on men of
war, in contrast to "External Asylum" comprising the right of political refugees to enter a
foreign country (1937) 1, 5. See CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW OF MONTE-
VwEO (1889) Art. XVI.
10. Great Britain 1726 in Spain (Duke of Riperda), 1867 in Greece (Jews), 1870 in
Guatemala, 1873 in S. Domingo and Spain (Marshal Serrano), 1895 in Turkey (Said Pacha);
France 1858, 1865 in Peru; Germany 1830 in Guatemala; Denmark 1841 in Spain (Duke of
Sotomayor); Spain 1891 in Chile (Balmaceda), 1933 (Alessandri), 1935 in Venezuela; United
States 1850 in Ecuador, 1868 in Paraguay, 1874, 1875, 1898 in Bolivia, 1876 in Spain, 1877
in Mexico, 1891 in Chile.
11. The right was officially acknowledged by the Duke of Sotomayor when he became
Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1848, after having been saved by the right of asylum
accorded to him seven years before in the legation of Denmark. See note 10 supra.
12. (1943)6 Rzv. ARGENTINA DE DERECHO INTR RAcIONAL 4.
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and ratifications of the seven conventions up to August 1940. Later develop-
ments were not available to the author and, indeed, not very much has
since happened in this respect. Colombia deposited the ratification of the
Treaty on Maritime Neutrality, the United States signed the Treaty on
Asylum with reservations,13 Haiti ratified the Treaty on Diplomatic Agents,
Honduras that on Civil Strife, Peru ratified all treaties with the exception of
that on Maritime Neutrality. This shows no very great progress in the last
five and a half years. After eighteen years Argentina and Paraguay still
have not ratified a single one of the treaties, Bolivia, Honduras and Vene-
zuela only one, Chile, Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras only two of them.
It should be observed, however, that since the signature of the Convention
on Asylum by the United States only one convention, that on Treaties,
remains unsigned by a single state, Salvador.
Being written in French, the book is addressed principally to European
lawyers with the intention of familiarizing them with Inter-American con-
cepts of international law. But its contents are so instructive that it would
be worth while to consider an English and a Spanish translation.
E. voN HOFmANNsTrALt
Tma COLLECTED PAPERS OF JomN BASSETT Moom. New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1944. Pp. lvi, 3200. Seven vols. $20.00.
FOR three score years and four, seldom has a year passed without a con-
tribution from the skillful pen of John Bassett Moore. The materials in-
cluded in these seven volumes require a twenty-page bibliography merely
to list them. Not included in the Collected Papers are his sLx-volume History
and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the Unzitcd States has been
a Party, his eight-volume Digest of International Law, his six-volume Inter-
national Adjudications, his twelve-volume edition of The Worhs of James
Bvxhanan, or half a dozen other volumes on extraterritorial crime, extra-
dition, and kindred topics. Omitted also are his separate opinions as Judge
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. When it is considered that
Judge Moore has spent many busy years as a professor, as a practicing law-
yer, as legal adviser in the Department of State, as Assistant Secretary and
Acting Secretary of State, as Judge on the Permanent Court of International
Justice, and as a plenipotentiary to numerous international conferences, his
productivity as a scholar is all the more remarkable.
This is not the place for an appraisal of his influence on American diplo-
macy or of his extensive contributions to the development and application
13. The United States delegation declared at Havana "that it does not recognize the
right of asylum as part of international law," in spite of the cases mentioned in note 10 supra.
fMember of Council of the International Law Association, Corresponding Mlember of
the Argentine Institute of International Law.
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of the principles of international law. Let it suffice to say that no serious
student of international law and diplomacy can afford to neglect the contri-
butions of Judge Moore.
The papers reprinted in these volumes include two entire books previously
published by Judge Moore, and now out of print: his Principles of American
Diplomacy, published in 1918, and his International Law and Some Current
Illusions, first published in 1924. The Collected Papers include over 150
articles, more than one hundred book reviews, and numerous occasional ad-
dresses, tributes, letters to the editor, as well as several jingles composed by
the learned Judge in his lighter moments. Several papers are here published
for the first time. Of these, mention should be made of "Peace, Law, and
Hysteria" (Vol. VII, pp. 220-349), chiefly written prior to 1936, but com-
pleted in 1-943. In the first half of this dissertation, Judge Moore sagely
discusses the fundamental causes of war and castigates, exponents of pana-
ceas which, he believes, neglect those fundamentals. The latter half deals
with the growth and reception of international law; reason, justice and
equity; morality and law; judicial discretion; and international arbitration;
and its mellow wisdom is the distillation of-years of study and participation
in public affairs.
The writings of John Bassett Moore are characterized by an unhurried,
flowing, and powerful style, frequently pierced with shafts of wit, occasion-
ally studded with invaluable personal reminiscences of men and events, and
are noteworthy for their grasp, insight, and maturity. The gathering of these
scattered papers into accessible form is of inestimable value to students of
international law and diplomacy.
HERBERT W. BRIGGSt
tProfessor of Government, Cornell University.
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